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Abstract
We study bargained input prices where up and downstream rms can choose alternative vertical
partners. We apply our model to bargained airport landing fees where a number of interesting
policy questions have arisen. For example, what is the impact of joint ownership of airports?
Does airline countervailing power stop airports raising fees? Should airports be prohibited, as
an EU directive intends, from charging dierential prices to airlines? Our major ndings are
(a) an increase in upstream concentration or in the substitutability between airports always
increases the landing fee; (b) the eect of countervailing power, via an increase in downstream
concentration, depends on the competition regime between airlines and whether airports can
price discriminate: airline concentration reduces the landing fee when downstream competition
is in quantities, but if downstream competition is in prices only where airports cannot discrim-
inate. Furthermore, only in a specic case (Bertrand competition, uniform landing fees and
undierentiated goods) will lower fees pass through to consumers. (c) With Cournot competi-
tion, uniform landing fees are always higher than discriminatory fees, while the reverse is true
with Bertrand competition. We also look at the incentives for airport expansion which raise
quantities of passengers paying a given landing fee, but alters the nature of airline competition,
which changes the landing fee.
JEL Numbers: D43, L13, L93, R48
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The airline market has provided fertile territory for huge numbers of theoretical and empirical pa-
pers in economics. Perhaps one reason is that its institutional features span so many interesting
phenomena: competition, regulation, networks, auctions, unionised labour markets, the environ-
ment, consumer transport choice, etc. But relative to that considerable weight of work there is very
little on what would seem a rather important complementary input, namely airports.1
Perhaps until twenty years ago, it might be argued that the study of airports was not particularly
rewarding either by itself or as something that might inform the study of airline competition. Most
airports were public sector owned and regulation or specic agreements held landing fees to non-
prot levels. The vast majority of airports held plenty of spare capacity and their location was a
historical accident, new entry was almost unheard of. Competition between airports was a fanciful
notion regarded as impossible. Thus for example the UK 1976 Department of Trade described the
common ownership of UK airports as \ensuring the concentration of activity at a small number of
airport and no wasteful competition between airports" (quoted in Barrett, 2000). The only benet
of dispersed airport ownership they could nd was that local communities would derive \local pride
in the ownership and operation of regional airports".
The position today looks very dierent. First, market structure. Low cost airlines have brought
new, often non-central airports, into eective competition. Even in large cities, competition has
emerged between (non-congested) airports: privately owned rival airports have engaged in doc-
umented bidding wars over lower landing fees to tempt airlines in cities like Moscow, Belfast,
Melbourne, Orlando, Miami and London.2 And competition has grown even in relatively con-
gested airports where network externalities are important: 33% of London Heathrow passengers
only change planes there, leading Heathrow to publically claim that it competes with hub airports
in Paris, Frankfurt and even Dubai. Second, privatisation. 55 countries have partially or totally
privatised their airports (IATA, 2007). Third, regulation. There are currently a series of major
regulatory changes proposed to airports. In the UK, the Competition Commission in 2009 have
ruled that BAA, the joint owner of most major UK airports (London Heathrow, London Gatwick,
London Stansted, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Southampton and Aberdeen), should be broken up. The
new EU Airport Charges Directive (2009/12/EC) imposes a host of regulations for large airports,
notably \non-discrimination", i.e., the same airport must negotiate the same input charge to all
1The major exception being the analysis of slot auctions to allocate crowded space at airports. This literature
does not deal with modeling of landing fees that we look at here. We neglect slot auctions in the work below, for
in practice, many European airports have slot allocation via grandfather rights, that is, slots are allocated according
to whether airlines operated that slot last period. Whether this is an optimal mechanism is not the subject of this
paper: but we note that while grandfather rights might give (intertemporal) market power and not optimally solve
congestion problems, they do have benet of providing incentives for airlines to sink costs: the baggage system at
Heathrow Terminal 1 for example was built by one of the airlines.
2We document numerous examples below.
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airlines. Other regulatory changes in train include examinations of single and dual till regulation
whereby retailing revenue at airports is returned to airlines or airports respectively. Fourth, conges-
tion. Airports have increasingly become more congested raising additional problems in short-run
landing fee pricing but also long run capacity expansion (Borenstein and Rose, 2007). New runways
have been vetoed in London but the new runway at Frankfurt is due to be completed in 2011.
We cannot study all these questions in one paper. So the purpose of the paper is to set out a
framework that can answer at least the following policy-relevant questions: (a) what is the eect
on landing fees of ownership structure up and downstream? For example, should the commonly
owned UK airports be split up? (b) Would countervailing power from airlines ever be enough to
stop airports charging high airport fees so that even a geographically isolated airport does not need
regulation? (c) Should input price discrimination be allowed by airports? (d) As airports get more
congested, does that alter the nature of the relationship between airports and airlines?
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of a formal model of competition between vertical
chains of airports and airlines, and therefore we hope this paper is innovative on this account. We
also think the paper is of broader interest. First, one ingredient of our model is countervailing
power, an issue that is somewhat neglected in the formal literature but common in regulatory cases
where more or less concentrated intermediate suppliers and nal sellers face each other (e.g., farmers
and supermarkets, health insurance companies and hospitals). Second, it turns out that some of the
(rather few) existing models in this area have used particular demand functions that do not fully
satisfy some requirements such as negative cross-elasticities of demand. We work with a demand
system that has not been used in this literature before and thus show how we avoid some of the
implicit assumptions made in other cases.
All formal models will of course focus on some issues and abstract from others. Thus our
modeling choice is made in the context of the following considerations. First, in terms of theory,
the classic results on vertical relations depend upon up/downstream market structure and contract
structure (e.g., linear input taris) and so we need to make these as clear as possible in the model.
Second, an empirical fact is that many airports are quite congested and so we wish to take account
of this.3 Third, many airport decisions also concern investment. This needs a dynamic model which
we leave for another paper, but we use our framework to make at least some educated guesses.
Model outline. We model various degrees of up- and downstream market structure and demand.
Upstream, we assume two airports who have varying derived-demand substitutability between them.
The airports may be jointly owned, or be independently owned, to control for upstream concentra-
3The denition of congestion is complicated. Some airports, e.g., New York and Heathrow, are congested all day,
that is, no slots are available to land. Many others are congested in the mornings and evenings, but have available
slots in the middle of the day. Cost eciency in the low cost airline model however requires low-cost airlines to y
multiple legs per day meaning that an early morning departure is essential. Thus early-morning congestion is binding
for them.
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tion. Downstream, we assume up to four products (routes) with varying demand substitutability
among them. The ights can be operated by four separate airlines, or by two multiple product
airlines that y from both airports. In this way, we can also investigate the eects of changes in
downstream concentration.
Our main endogenous variable of interest is the per passenger landing fee, `, that the airport
charges to the airline. Empirically, this is the major source of revenues at most airports, above
parking and retailing. For traditional airlines, airport charges account for 5% of full service airline
costs on average, but 20% of total costs for low cost airlines (for comparison, fuel is 18% and 10%
of costs respectively; CAA, 2006). This is modeled by assuming that the airport and airline rst
bargain over ` at a particular airport, and then the airlines play a market game. In that initial
bargain over `, the airlines can threaten to go to a rival airport. In addition, we model contracts
where ` is uniform between airlines, as current regulation mandates, or can vary. To solve the
model we use the Nash Bargaining solution, which, informally, has the following general form. The
bargained ` reconciles the outside options of the parties and what we call their \concession costs".
The latter are the costs of conceding higher ` (which reduces prots for the airlines) and lower `
(which reduces prots for the airport).
Bargaining eects in the model. A number of ceteris paribus eects follow immediately; the net
result on ` we set out below. First, an increased outside option for the airport will raise `. So, if only
one company owns both airports, its outside option is increased. It turns out then, that increased
concentration in airport ownership, or airports that are more dissimilar, raises `. Airports' outside
options are also raised with discriminatory input pricing. Under uniform pricing, disagreement
with one airline means disagreement with the other; no airline ies and hence the airport earns no
revenue. Under discriminatory pricing, an alternative airline can still y even with disagreement
with one airline, raising the outside option of the airport. Thus under discriminatory pricing there
is a tendency toward higher ` (in fact the full eect turns out to depend on how discriminatory
pricing aects concession costs, see below).
Second, an increased outside option for the airline will tend to lower `. So, if one airline owns a
route at an alternative airport, then its outside option is increased, since in the event of disagreement
it can still operate the other route. It turns out then, that in most cases, increased concentration
in airline ownership, or routes that are more dissimilar, lowers `.
Third, the bargained ` also depends on the \concession eect", that is, the cost to airlines of
conceding such a rise or airports in conceding a fall. These costs depend on the type of down-
stream competition. One natural assumption is Bertrand price competition between airlines with
dierentiated products. This assumes that airlines precommit to prices and then accommodate
all passengers who want to y. We face the empirical reality however that crowded airports have
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a rationed number of slots, xing thereby the number of planes that can y per season.4 The
precise modeling of this is a matter for future work, so for the moment, we model this alternative
environment as Cournot competition, where quantities are pre-committed.
Regarding the concession eects, an increase in ` for an airline always has a direct negative
impact on prots, causing the airline to resist such a proposed rise. However, with Bertrand
competition, there is also an indirect (strategic) eect that provokes competitors to raise prices too,
relaxing price competition. Thus the costs of concession are greater under Cournot than Bertrand,
and so a higher ` is resisted more strongly by the airlines under Cournot competition than Bertrand.
In particular, the concession cost is greatest under Cournot and discriminatory prices: an input
price rise to an airline causes lower output (due to the direct cost eect), but the indirect/strategic
eect of that lower output under Cournot, makes the rival airline raise output, reducing considerably
the prot of the airline and thus making the concession eect particularly large in this case.
Model ndings. Our ndings thus follow from these various eects. Some of them are re-enforcing
and thus we obtain unambiguous comparative statics. Others are countervailing and so the net
results depend on functional form.
1. Upstream market power raises `. Under a wide range of market structures, downstream market
games and contract structure, ` is higher with common ownership of airports or less substitutability
between them. This follows essentially from the assumption that in the bargaining over ` stage,
airlines can threaten to go to another airport. Their outside option is much muted with common
airport ownership or little airport substitutability.
2. Downstream market power (countervailing market power) generally lowers `. Downstream con-
centration raises the airline outside option, for a concentrated airline can y its other route from
the other airport in the event of disagreement (unconcentrated airlines ying one route each have
no such option). This tends to lower `. However, there are two opposing eects. First, airports
raise their outside options when they can discriminate between airlines, tending to raise `. Second,
increases in ` are less resisted by airlines with discriminatory pricing and Bertrand competition,
since concession costs are, as discussed above, the lowest in this case. Thus it turns out that there
is one case with a suciently strong opposing eect to fall in ` from more airline countervailing
power, that is, with discriminatory pricing and Bertrand competition, where ` ends up rising.
3. Downstream market power generally increases nal prices. Whilst the eect above sets out what
happens to `, it is of interest to nd out what happens to nal consumer prices. As seen immediately
above, an increase in airline countervailing power generally lowers `. But one might ask: does that
reduction in ` \pass through"to a reduction in nal prices to the passengers? The answer is positive
4At London Heathrow for example, there are 1,357 slots per day (nighttime ights are banned, space between
slots is 45 seconds to allow for air vortices); currently only 12 pairs are available (Airport Co-ordination Limited,
2010).
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only in particular cases, for, in general, increased concentration downstream means, even though
airlines pay lower `, they can use some of that to raise prots. It turns out that nal prices only fall
with intense Bertrand competition and uniform fees, in which case countervailing power is enough
to lower ` and also for that lower ` to be passed through to cheaper nal prices.
4. The eect of uniform or discriminatory prices depends on downstream structure: with Bertrand, a
discriminatory ` is higher, with Cournot, is lower. Our ndings allowing input price discrimination
versus uniform pricing turn out to depend upon the competition mode. Discriminatory pricing
raises the outside option of the airport and hence tends to raise `. As we saw, however, the overall
impact on ` depends also on the concession eect. The costs of conceding a higher ` to the airline are
greater under Cournot than Bertrand and particularly under Cournot and discriminatory prices.
It turns out that, under our assumptions, with Bertrand competition, the initial eect, namely
that allowing discriminatory prices raises the outside option of the airport so raising `, still holds.
Even though airlines resist such increases, the resistance is not enough, due to the strategic eect
of softening price competition, to end up lowering `. However, with Cournot, the resistance to an
increase in ` rises considerably, such that, overall, allowing discriminatory pricing lowers `.
Related work. As pointed out above, the bulk of the academic literature in this area is not focused on
how landing fees emerge from the airport/airline bargain. It is however very rich, looking at airline
competition, employee compensation, slot congestion, noise etc., much of which is summarized in
Borenstein and Rose (2007) andWinston (2009) for example. In the widely cited paper by Brueckner
(2002), an airport sets congestion charges with either competitive or monopolistic airlines, but
there is no competition with other airports.5 In De Borger and Van Dender (2006), two airports
unilaterally set user charges and choose capacity in the light of congestion costs that are assumed
to reduce demand at each airport; there is no modeling of airlines. Some comparatively recent
papers that touch on airport competition are Barrett (2000) and Starkie (2001, 2002), the former
a rich series of case studies on low cost airlines and the latter papers with some speculation on
countervailing airline/airport power but no formal model. Forsyth (2006) reviews informally several
policy questions related to airport competition, while Zhang and Zhang (2003) reviews airport
privatization.
There are two recent studies on landing fees by Van Dender (2007) for the 55 large US airports
and Bel and Fageda (2010) for 100 large EU airports. Both nd lower landing fees when airports
face airport competition, an eect predicted by our model. But in the US it appears that increased
airline concentration raises landing fees, whilst lowering it in the EU. As we shall show, the impact of
concentration on landing fees depends also on whether there is price discrimination and congestion
5Other contributions in this stream of the literature on approaches to internalize congestion are Pels and Verhoef
(2004), Zhang and Zhang (2006), Basso and Zhang (2007), Morrison and Winston (2007), Bruekner (2009), and
Verhoef (2010).
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at the airport. Thus we can explain this diering eect to the extent that US airports are on
average less congested than EU airports, which in our model changes the strategic interaction
between airlines and so the comparative static eect of airline concentration on landing fees.
The application of our modelling approach to airports and airlines is natural, but we point
out that these questions are examples of broader issues of \countervailing power", whereby, in a
vertical chain, more or less concentrated upstream suppliers interact with more or less concentrated
downstream buyers. Such questions have been discussed informally since at least Galbraith's (1952)
book, but have excited theory interest only more recently. The most directly applicable model in this
area is Horn and Wolinsky (1988) who model a downstream duopoly who buy inputs on bilateral
monopoly relations with suppliers. The price of such inputs is determined by Nash bargaining
between each rm and its supplier and they examine what happens to such prices when the upstream
suppliers merge. We contrast our results with them below. Other work includes Dobson and
Waterson (1997, 2007) who study Bertrand competition with dierentiated products. Milliou and
Petrakis (2007) study the incentives for upstream mergers in a model in which the input price is
set via a Nash bargaining. Gal-Or and Dukes (2006) study merger incentives in the media industry,
where media stations bargain with producers for advertising rates. Gal-Or (1997) studies the case
where health insurance companies and hospitals bargain over the reimbursement rate (i.e., the
input price). All these works generalize along various dimensions the initial contribution of Horn
and Wolinsky (1988). But, as emphasized below and in a companion paper by Iozzi and Valletti
(2010), they do make particular assumptions, hidden at times, on outside options and use particular
demand curves.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next Section, we set out some salient facts
about airports. In Section three, we set out our model assumptions and in Section four the results.
Section ve summarises and concludes. An Appendix contains the analytical details.
2 Institutional background to model and results
We now turn to some of the details of the airport market, that inform our questions and modeling.
Most of the details below relate to the UK, but much of that experience is common to other
countries.
Location and new building. The location of airports relates to possible competition between them
and new building to entry. Airport location in the UK is a historical accident, dictated largely by
extensive building in WWII.6 On the extensive margin, local planning restrictions makes building
of new airports more or less impossible. Thus the only opportunity for entry is the opening of
6Heathrow for example was started in 1930 as a test aerodrome for early aircraft factories and then requisitioned
in WWII. Stansted was chosen to be London's third airport because it possessed an unusually long runway, left over
from WWII where it was used for landings by damaged planes.
6
a past military airport for civil use. There are only two examples of note in the UK, Doncaster
and Manston (both ex RAF). Manston, a remote airport on the Kent coast, went bankrupt after
one year of scheduled ights. Doncaster, situated in South Yorkshire near Sheeld and Leeds,
opened in 2005, had their initial planning application successfully blocked by East Midlands so
their entry has been drastically slowed.7 The intensive margin is to build a new runway. No new
runway has been built in the SE of the UK for 60 years and the new Government has blocked
new runways at London Heathrow, Stansted and Gatwick: Luton cannot build a new runway due
to local topography. Manchester succeeded in building a new runway which opened 5 years ago.
Overall then, entry into the airport business is very hard.
Passenger travelling between airports and overlapping routes. An important element of potential
competition between airports is the extent to which passengers are willing to travel between al-
ternative airports oering overlapping routes. Passenger choice of airports has been studied quite
extensively. In the UK, recent evidence is summarised in OFT (2007) who nd considerable readi-
ness of passengers to travel between airports and considerable route overlap. In 2005 for example,
Heathrow ran daily ights to 180 destinations, Gatwick to 210. Of these, 86 destinations were served
from both airports. Of these 180 destinations served daily by Heathrow, over 40 were also served
daily from Stansted, and Stansted and Gatwick had ights to around 80 common destinations on a
daily basis. Elsewhere there is competition between airports, for example those in Belfast, Moscow,
Orlando, Melbourne, Miami/Ft Lauderdale.
Airport ownership. Ownership of UK airports was by local municipalities, except for the largest,
London Heathrow, London Stansted, London Gatwick, Glasgow and Edinburgh, and Aberdeen all
of which were owned by the central government, until they were privatised in 1996 to be owned by
the British Airports Authority (BAA). These BAA airports accounted for 93% of UK air trac.
After a two-year investigation the UK Competition Commission (CC, 2009) ruled that BAA should
be broken up to improve competition. During the case, BAA argued that competition between
airports was infeasible due to their geographical remoteness and/or their being full, and any local
monopoly power was oset by the countervailing power of dominant airlines. The low cost airlines
argued strongly that competition was feasible and would bring benets. Manchester and Luton are
both owned by the local municipality, but managed privately and compete under commercial terms.
The other UK airports all compete freely with each other. Similar examples of joint ownership are
in other countries. For example, in Rome Ciampino and Fiumicino are jointly owned, as are the
major Paris and New York airports.8
7Rival airports in Nottingham objected to Doncaster renaming themselves \Doncaster Robin Hood" airport.
Doncaster is in fact in Nottingham by virtue of the 1957 runway extension that extended the runway 200 feet into
the county of Nottinghamshire.
8Although the terminals at JFK are independently owned. For an extensive review of the US, see FAA (1999).
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Charging. Most airports make their money by charging airlines who use the airport. This fee is made
up of three main components, of which Heathrow is illustrative. First, 70% of it is per passenger.
For example, an airline leaving Heathrow has to pay 22.97 GBP per passenger to international
destinations (and 13.43 GBP to domestic, see Heathrow Airport, 2010, table 5.2). Second, 19%
is a fee for each aircraft landing movement. This charge diers by (unlaiden) weight. Third, the
remaining 11% is for parking, which depends on length of time, time of day and weight. There is a
rebate for the non-use of stands, currently 3.79 GBP at Heathrow (which is why low cost airlines do
not use stands). Thus the vast bulk of fees vary by passenger, and since more passengers increase
weight, the movement and parking charges eectively vary by passenger as well. Thus the observed
charges have only a very minor nonlinear part tari element and hence we model charges as linear
in passengers.
Landing fees dier substantially between airports and, sometimes, between airlines at an airport.
In their sample of 100 major European airports for example, Bel and Fageda (2010) nd a coecient
of variation of 0.37. The exact landing fees depend on the circumstances at the airport. Regarding
congested regulated airports, fees do not tend to dier between airlines, but do between airports in
line with, e.g., local capital costs, operating expenses and investment plans. In uncongested airport,
the typical variation in prices is temporal. Airlines who start a route are oered an initial discount
which expires after a few years. At the end of that time, they then renegotiate the price, which tend
to then depend on how full the airport is and alternatives, see the examples set out below. So for
example, no airlines at Heathrow or Gatwick have discounts. At Stansted introductory discounts
expired in March 2007 and were not continued when the airport was more or less full (see OFT,
2007, para 5.64).9
Landing fees at the major London airports, Heathrow, Stansted and Gatwick are capped by
regulation. This has led to a major set of arguments around the appropriate price cap level and
incentive to invest. These are somewhat beyond the scope of the current paper, but we do ask if
regulation is needed at all.
Bargaining and the determination of landing fees. In the UK, landing fees in the major airports
have been regulated since privatisation. At capacity constrained airports, such as Heathrow and
the summer in Gatwick, and early morning slots at Luton and Stansted, the landing fees charged
are those at the price cap with no discounts. At other airports, a bargaining process occurs, that
was well documented by the Competition Commission report, for both UK and foreign cases (see
Competition Commission, 2009, Appendix 3.3).
9One might imagine that airports would try to vary charges by time of day. Airports in the UK do not do this
following a case brought by the US government in the early 1980s when Heathrow attempted to introduce peak load
pricing by raising landing fees for early morning arrivals. This was held to be discriminatory against US carriers
who land early morning by reason of global time dierences and Heathrow was obliged to pay substantial damages
(Starkie, 2002).
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As an example, take Cardi and Bristol which are are about 50 miles apart. Both have plenty
of spare capacity. In all commercial UK airports, airlines are oered a preliminary discount to
establish new routes, which then expire, typically after three years when the airline reverts back
to the published tari. In 2006, the discounts oered to Ryanair at Cardi expired, and were not
renewed. Ryanair immediately switched its daily Dublin service to Bristol. In 2007, Flybe were
operating twice weekly services from Bristol to Paris. They switched that route to Cardi following
the refusal of Bristol to lower its charges. Thomas Cook, by contrast, stayed at Bristol following
an oer of a lower landing charge. At Liverpool and Manchester for example, Flybe moved from
Liverpool to Manchester following discounts oered by Liverpool in 2005. In 2006, Jet2 moved from
Manchester to Leeds following Manchester's refusals to continue introductory discounts that had
expired. Likewise, Ryanair reduced services from Leeds after Leeds refused to lower their charges
in 2004.
Airline reaction to rivals. As we shall see, we have to make assumptions later in the paper on just
what reactions airlines can make in the event of bargaining breaking down between other airlines and
their chosen airport. Now the empirical evidence on this is hard to garner; in our model, bargaining
and settlement takes place instantly as we do not have a fully articulated extensive form dynamic
game describing all stages. Nonetheless there are some institutional points. First, regulated \list"
taris are of course available to all, but the details of negotiations are regarded as commercially
condential. Second, the evidence suggests limited scope for airlines to react to competitors in
some dimensions. Airlines can change pricing very rapidly and they do so via the software that
controls their yield management. However, their ability to change the number of ights is limited
in the short run. It is zero in heavily used airports, since there are no slots available. Even at
relatively empty airports, slots are preallocated months before the summer and winter season (on
the grandfather rights basis). It is true that vacant slots can then be allocated at short notice,
but in fact low cost airlines rely heavily on early morning slots and these might be unavailable.
Reactions by varying the aircraft size is limited by economies of scope: low cost airlines never vary
eet size to keep economies of scope by having the same planes in operation. Launching a whole new
route is costly, since it needs marketing spending; in contrast, airlines can easily react within their
route system: airlines can and do switch aircrafts between pre-existing slots at dierent airports
for example.
Price discrimination. At \designated" airports, price \discrimination", often called \dierential
pricing", is covered by section 41 of the Airports Act, 1986.10 The essential point is that airports are
not allowed to price discriminate between airlines who are oered the same service from the airport.
The precise interpretation of this is complicated of course, and in practice airlines at Heathrow and
10On dierential charging, see CAA (2007)
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Gatwick pay the same price to the airport (with the exception of whether they use a stand or not)
whereas airlines elsewhere pay dierent prices.11
By spring 2011, airport charges at 144 European airports (above 1 million passengers per an-
num, mppa) will also to be subject to the EU Airport Charges Directive.12 It generally outlaws
\dierential pricing" unless on the basis of clear dierences in service levels oered. Airports are
required to publish clearly their revenues, costs and methodology for price calculation. Discrim-
ination in pricing on the basis of airline country of origin is outlawed. Once again, the practical
interpretation of this is open to question. As we saw above, landing charges vary by service level,
e.g., low cost airlines do not tend to use passenger steps. But they also vary by time, i.e., airlines
get a discount for a launch of a new service; it is not clear whether this will be outlawed by the
directive. The Directive is opposed by Ryanair (Ryanair, 2008).
3 The model
We consider an industry in which two upstream suppliers, A and B, sell an intermediate good to
downstream rms. Downstream rms use this input to produce four dierentiated goods, 1 to 4,
and sell them to nal consumers. We take upstream rms A and B to be airports, and downstream
rms to be airlines, which y passengers along designated routes: routes 1 and 2 can only depart
from airport A, while airport B is the origin of routes 3 and 4. Each nal product is therefore as
an individual ight service on a given route and the quantities sold by airlines correspond to the
number of passengers traveling along the dierent routes.
Costs. For an airline, the only input per passenger is a slot at the airport, identical to all airlines
and normalized to one. Airports receive a linear input price ` per passenger for the intermediate
good, which we refer to as the landing charge; under our simplifying assumptions, this is clearly
the only cost borne by airlines. All airports' costs are normalized to zero.
Consumer preferences. Demand originates from a representative consumer. As we discuss below, it
will be important in what follows to specify demand systems that have certain desirable properties
and so we generalise Shubik and Levitan (1980), and assume that the quasi-linear utility function
11This has come under some strain in Heathrow where British Airways have a brand new terminal and other
airlines are in a building site, however, uniform prices have remained due to the impossibility of judging dierent
quality in such an interlocked airport.
12See also NERA (2009) and Competition Commission (2009), para 6.15.
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of the representative consumer is given by
























where I is the consumption of other goods.
This utility gives rise to a linear demand structure; letting q be the vector of ight services for
all routes (i.e., q  fq1; q2; q3; q4g), inverse demand for good 1 is given by




(q1 + q2 + b (q3 + q4)) ; (2)
whenever this is positive. Similar expressions hold for the inverse demand of the other goods. The
parameters b and m describe the nature of the substitutability between the goods. Substitutability
between the pair of routes 1 and 2, and the pair of routes 3 and 4, depends on m, where m 2 [0;1];
as m approaches innity, these goods tend to become pairwise homogeneous, while when m = 0
they all are completely independent. Parameter m thus measures the degree of substitutability
between the two routes ying from the same airport; it is assumed to be equal in the two airports,
thus restricting our analysis to symmetric equilibria. Good 1 (and, symmetrically, good 2) is also
substitutable for goods 3 and 4 in an equal manner, determined both by m and by an additional
parameter b, where b 2 [0; 1]. When b = 0, good 1 is completely independent of the two other
goods, while when b = 1 they are as substitutable as good 2, depending on the specic value of m.
In words, b is the substitution parameter between airports, and, when it is equal to 1, we are back
in the original Shubik and Levitan setting, where substitution is identical (but depending on m)
for all pairs of goods..
Inverting the system of four inverse demands as (2), the system of linear direct demand functions
can be derived. With all the four goods sold in the nal market, and letting p denote the price




  2(1 + b+m)p1 +m[1 +m(1  b)](p1   p2)  bm(p3 + p4)
4(1 + b)[1 +m+ b(1 m)] (3)
whenever this is positive. Similar expressions also hold for the other goods.
Desirable properties of the demand system. This demand system allows for dierences in the nature
of the substitutability between dierent groups of goods, but nevertheless maintains some of the
desirable features of the original system proposed by Shubik and Levitan (1980). In particular,







This implies that total demand is fully independent ofm, the substitution parameter between ights
in the same airport. But it depends only on b, the substitution parameter between airports, which
is typically related to the \catchment" area of each airport, i.e., the distance that passengers have
to travel to reach the airport. In particular, with two geographically-independent airports (b = 0)
demand is twice the size than with perfectly substitute airports (b = 1). In other words, with two
very distant airports we have two independent islands, each of maximal size 1 and with two goods
each; with identical airports, we have a single island of size 1 and four goods. For a given total size,
routes represent the preferences of consumers on where to y. This is a desirable property, in that
market size does not vary with the number of routes or their substitutability at given prices, which
makes comparisons between dierent bargains with outside options a legitimate exercise.
Another important property of this demand system is that, both for direct and indirect demands,
derivatives with respect to the relevant argument have the expected sign, allowing us to analyze
both quantity and price competition. In particular, from (2) and (3), it is easy to check that
@pi
@qi
< @pi@qj < 0, and that
@qi
@pi
< 0 < @qi@pj , for all i; j = 1; : : : ; 4. We therefore believe that our demand
system can be seen as a contribution of the paper, with potential applications to other multiproduct
industries.13
Market structure. We consider, as a base case, a market structure with the two upstream airports
owned by separate rms, A and B, and the four routes own by two separate airlines, with airline
13 ying routes 1 and 3, and another airline, named 24, ying routes 2 and 4. In order to study
the eects of changes in concentration up- and downstream, we contrast this base case against two
possible variations. Our rst variation entails a downstream industry as in the base case but a more
concentrated upstream market, with the two upstream airports being under joint ownership, and
denoted with AB. The second variation we look at has an upstream market structure identical to
our base case but a dierent downstream ownership structure, whereby the four routes are own by
fully independent airlines, whose payo will be denoted using subscripts from 1 to 4. This allows
to assess the eects of a change in downstream concentration. This framework, albeit not general,
is a very parsimonious and, as it will turn out, eective way of looking at the eects of changes
in down- and upstream market structure on the market equilibrium, while keeping the number of
products (and the consumers' preferences) xed.
To summarize, we denote with U = (A;B;AB) the set of all possible upstream players, and with
D = (1; 2; 3; 4; 13; 24) the set of all possible downstream players. These hypotheses on the players'
13Some of the properties of our demand system are also common to the one in use to by Dobson and Waterson
(1997), which extends to many goods the classical Singh and Vives (1984) set-up and which is now widely used.
Singh and Vives demand system suers from the fact that the market size is not independent from the dierentiation
parameter between goods. Its generalisation to more than two goods is very delicate and it has the undesirable
feature that some of the cross-price derivatives of the direct demand functions do not have the sign one should expect
for substitute goods. Our demand system does not suer from these problems.
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ownership give rise to three possible market structures:14
2 2 : Two airports, separately owned, with prots A = q1`1 + q2`2 and B = q3`3 + q4`4, and
two airlines ying routes 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, with prots 13 = (p1   `1)q1 + (p3   `3)q3
and 24 = (p2   `2)q2 + (p4   `4)q4 respectively;
1 2 : Two airports, with common ownership, with prots AB =
P
i=1;:::;4 qi`i, and two airlines
ying routes 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, with prots as in case 2 2;
2 4 : Two airports, separately owned, with prots as in case 2 2, and four independent airlines
ying one route each and with prots i = (pi   `i)qi for i = 1; : : : ; 4.
Input price discrimination. We will also consider dierent hypotheses regarding the possibility for
an airport of setting discriminatory landing charges to the airlines ying from that airport. In case
of discriminatory charges, we allow the negotiation between the dierent parties at the same airport
to give rise to dierent landing charges. On the other hand, when charges are uniform, all airlines
ying from the same airport face the same input price.15
Market game. Competition in the industry is described by a two-stage game as follows. At stage
1, each airport negotiates with the airlines ying from that airport the linear input price ` (the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of these bargains is further discussed in the next section). At
stage 2, all airlines observe the outcomes of stage 1 and compete against each other, either in prices
(Bertrand) or in quantities (Cournot), given the values of the input prices from stage 1. We derive
the pure strategy symmetric equilibrium of this game.
3.1 Bargaining
The rst-stage negotiations are conducted simultaneously so that, during bargaining, the rms'
negotiators treat the other landing charges as given.16 Each bargain is obtained using the n-person
Nash solution. The outcome is then a set of input prices which represents a Nash equilibrium in
the Nash bargains.
We denote by d(`) the downstream prot in the last stage of airline d, with d 2 D, and by
u(`) the upstream prot in the last stage of airport u, with u 2 U . We also let d and u be the
disagreement payo for airline d and airport u respectively.
The Nash Bargaining problem. In the discriminatory case, four landing charges, f`1; `2; `3; `4g; have
to be determined. At stage 1, each airport u forms a separate bargaining unit with each airline d
14The demand system also allows to obtain results for the case 1 4: This is not reported for the sake of brevity.
15Uniformity eventually applies to landing charges at one specic airport, thus a uniform price constraint applies
separately to dierent airports, even under the same ownership.
16In case of simultaneous negotiation with dierent counterparts, this means that separate negotiators are sent to
conduct independent negotiations with each counterpart.
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ying from that airport. Each unit bargains over `i, with i = 1; : : : ; 4. The bargaining solution is
found maximizing the following Nash product
max
`i
[u(`i; ` i)  u]  [d(`i; ` i)  d]1  for u 2 U and d 2 D (4)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the bargaining power of the airport relative to that of the airline.
In the uniform case, two landing charges, f`A; `Bg; have to be determined. At stage 1, each
airport u forms a separate bargaining unit with both airlines ying from that airport. Each unit
bargains over `h, the common landing charge any airline has to pay for each passenger ying from





2 [d0(`h; ` h) d0 ]
1 
2 for u 2 U and d; d0 2 D (5)
Notice that, in this uniform case, we have not altered the bargaining power  of the airport
compared to the discriminatory case, but divided 50:50 the residual bargaining power of the airlines.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the interests of the downstream rms ying from the same airport are
aligned, and thus (5) simplies to
max
`h
[u(`h; ` h)  u]  [d(`h; ` h)  d]1  for u 2 U and d 2 D (6)
This is directly comparable to (4), as the bargaining power of the airport does change in the two
scenarios. Hence, when assessing uniform versus discriminatory landing fees, eventual dierences
will not arise from having altered the relative bargaining strengths.
The actual form of the players' prot in (4) and (6) depends on the market structure, on the
mode of downstream competition, and on the possibility to set discriminatory charges.
To illustrate, take the case with market structure 2  4 and with quantity competition down-
stream.17 Equilibrium quantities in the second stage, denoted with q24i , are obtained solving
a standard Cournot game for the 4 independent airlines. Plugging these equilibrium quanti-
ties in the expression for prots in the rst stage, airline i's prots are given by 24i (`) 




i (`)  `i for




i (`)  `i for airport B.
In case of uniform charges, the bargaining problem between airport A and airlines 1 and 2,




  [241 (`A; `B)]1  ; (7)
while a similar problem between airport B and airlines 3 and 4, solves for `B . Notice that the outside
option is now equal to zero for both parties: as to the airport, because of the non discrimination
requirement, a failure to negotiate with one airline implies that no other airline can y from the
same airport. As to the airlines, a zero outside option follows from the very dispersed ownership,
under which each airline can y along one route only.
17All cases are illustrated in the Appendix.
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In case of discriminatory charges, the bargaining problem between airport A and airline i,
formulated in general terms in (4), can now be restated as
max
`i
[24A (`i; ` i)  24A ]  [24i (`i; ` i)]1  for i = 1; 2: (8)
Likewise, airport B forms two distinct bilateral bargaining units with airlines 3 and 4 for the
denition of `3 and `4 respectively. Notice the now positive outside option for the airport: since
landing fees are discriminatory, the failure of the negotiation still leaves open the possibility of
selling to the other airline.
Disagreement payo. We now turn to discuss the disagreement payos of the above bargaining
problems. In the event of an unsuccessful negotiation between an airport and the airline(s) over a
landing charge, the corresponding route(s) cannot be operated and market players can only derive
alternative prots from operating other routes.
The impossibility of operating one or more routes has two immediate consequences on demand
and the strategic behaviour of other parties where bargaining has not broken down. First, consumers
are unable to buy ight services on these routes and the system of demand functions has to,
therefore, be re-adjusted. In the system of inverse demand functions (2), the quantity of demanded
services on the routes aected by the breakdown is simply set equal to zero. Similarly, the system
of direct demands (3) has to be re-obtained by removing these routes from the consumer's choice
when inverting the system of inverse demand functions.
The second important consequence depends on the way the downstream rivals react to the
disagreement, which in turn hinges on their possibility of observing the negotiation breakdown. We
will assume that players not directly involved in a negotiation cannot observe the breakdown of that
negotiation.18 Therefore, in case of a breakdown, airlines not involved in the negotiation are not
able to adjust their behavior to the absence of some route(s) in the downstream market; in other
words, they adopt their optimal strategic behavior (in prices or quantities) as if all routes were
in operation. When airlines are multiproduct though (i.e., they oers routes from both airports),
those involved in a failed negotiation with one airport can observe this breakdown and, on the route
they operate from the other airport, react and adopt an optimal choice (in prices or quantities)
which takes into account that some routes are not in operation.19 From these (price or quantity)
choices of the airlines in case of disagreement, we can then compute the outside options for both
up- and downstream rms.
To illustrate, take the case of downstream quantity competition and market structure 1  2;
this is the more illustrative since it is one in which the disagreement payo is dierent from zero
both upstream and downstream.20 With uniform landing charges, the bargaining problem to set
18See Horn and Wolisnky (1988) and most of the literature using their approach.
19In this, we follow Dukes et al. (2006). For further discussion of the eects of the dierent options in modeling
the outside option in a Nash Bargaining over input prices in a vertical industry, see Iozzi and Valletti (2010).
20Details for all dierent cases are in the Appendix.
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the landing charge `A is for instance
max
`A
[12AB (`A; `B)  12AB ]  [1213 (`A; `B)  1213 ]1  :
In case of disagreement, uniform charges common to the airlines mean both airlines know that no
routes from airport A can be operated and then, in the competition stage of the game, adjust their
optimal choices from the other airport by solving the following problems
max
qi
[pi(0; 0; q3; q4)  lB ]  qi for i = 3; 4: (9)
In (9), notice that the demand function already anticipates the readjustment in the behavior of
consumers, who do not nd routes 1 and 2 on oer when making their purchase decisions. Letting
q03 and q
0
4 be the solution to these problems, we can use them to compute the disagreement payos
of the players. As for the airlines, the solution in this case is obtained by plugging back into (9)




4)   lB ]  q03). Similarly, the disagreement payo for the




4)  `B .
More subtle is the computation of the disagreement payos in case of discriminatory charges.
For ease of exposition, we concentrate on the bargaining over `1 which can now be stated as
max
`1
[12AB (`1; ` 1)  12AB ]  [1213 (`1; ` 1)  1213 ]1  :
In case of disagreement, airline 24 does not know about the breaking down of the negotiation and
therefore chooses quantities as if all the routes were served; in other words, it chooses still q2 and
q4 as along the equilibrium path where it maximizes [p2(q)  l2]  q2+ [p4(q)  l4]  q4. On the other
hand, airline 13 is an active part of the failed negotiation and thus knows that route 1 will not be
operated. Therefore, it readjusts its quantity choice over the other route, taking into account the
unchanged rivals' choices. In other words, it chooses q3 to maximize [p3(0; q2; q3; q4)   `3]  q3; let
this quantity be denoted by q03. We can now compute the disagreement payos of the players. The
outside option of airline 13 is given by 1213 = [p3(0; q2; q
0
3; q4)   l3]q03, while, for airport AB, we
have 12AB = q2`2 + q
0
3`3 + q4`4.
It is important to notice that the disagreement payos are independent from the negotiated
landing charges. As for the players not involved in the failed negotiation, they keep making their
last-stage anticipated choices as if all routes were in operation: these are calculated at the antici-
pated equilibrium input prices, and are therefore independent from the currently negotiated landing
charge. Similarly, the airlines involved in the breakdown of the negotiation readjust their strategic
choice to take into account the missing routes, selecting therefore a price or quantity which is by
denition independent from the negotiated landing charge.




u(`i; ` i)  u =  
@d(`i; ` i)  d)=@`i
@u(`i; ` i)  u)=@`i for u 2 U and d 2 D; (10)
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which we will use to illustrate the dierent forces aecting the level of the landing charge.
The LHS of (10) is a product of two terms. The rst term is simply the relative bargaining
power of the parties. This ratio is clearly increasing in  (the bargaining power of the airport).
The second term is the ratio between the prot levels of the two bargaining parties, net of the
value of their outside options. This ratio is decreasing in the equilibrium landing charge when the
downstream (respectively, upstream) net agreement prots are decreasing (respectively, increasing)
in `i. Both outside options depend on the nature of the market interaction but, as said above, are
independent of the negotiated landing charge; their role is simply to provide a shift to the LHS, for
each given value of `i. This reects the fact that a party becomes relatively stronger the higher is
the value of its outside option. The role of the outside options is therefore somewhat similar to the
one played by the players' bargaining power; while the bargaining power is exogenously given and
does not depend on the nature of the market interaction, the outside option depends on market
characteristics.
The RHS of (10) is the ratio of the marginal eects on the rms' prots of a change in the
landing charge. It can also be seen as the ratio of concession costs, dened as follows. First,
for the airline, a concession is an agreement to pay a higher landing charge; it increases its cost
and weakens its competitive position in the downstream market relative to rivals. Second, for the
airport, a concession is an agreement to accept a lower landing charge. Thus, the RHS illustrates
how the bargaining solution has the property that a party becomes relatively stronger the more
costly are its concessions, since it will more reluctant to concede. Contrary to the case of the LHS,
this ratio is typically increasing in `; this behavior with respect to ` is perhaps less intuitive, though
it reects the rather general property that the concession cost for a downstream rm relative to
that of the upstream rm, is higher the higher is the general level of the input price (and, thus, the
smaller is the equilibrium quantity produced by the downstream rm).
4 Results
We start by focusing rst on the simple cases where at least one of the two substitution parameters
is equal to 0, which reduces to a minimum the strategic eects between airports and/or airlines.
Then we consider the case of full strategic interaction between airports and airlines.
4.1 Cases without full vertical strategic interaction





under any circumstances: each airline has an independent product and must negotiate the landing
fee with the airport it is ying from. This implies that the landing charge varies from the monopoly
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price (1=2) to the competitive price (0) only depending to the bargaining power of the parties.
When b = 0, airports are independent. A landing charge equal to 2 is also the equilibrium
result when charges are uniform, irrespective to the mode of competition and the value of m. This
invariance result of the common input price sold by a monopolist to a downstream industry is
already known in the literature when the input price is set directly by the input provider (see, e.g.,
Greenhut and Ohta, 1976), and it is here immediately generalized to a simple Nash framework .















with Bertrand competition, which is clearly higher than the landing fee under Cournot competition.
Recall that, when b = 0, the two airports are fully independent and each route is a substitute only
to the other route from the airport (according to the value of m). The setting is therefore of one
upstream supplier and two symmetric competing downstream rms, similar to one analyzed in Iozzi
and Valletti (2010).21 They illustrate that a higher input price with Bertrand competition arises
due to the lower airline's concession cost: an increase in the input price is \resisted less" under price
competition compared to Cournot competition because, ceteris paribus, it softens competition .
These results on market structure and dierentiation parameters are knife-edge cases, due to the
lack of full strategic interactions in the vertical chains. In what follows, we focus our attention on
the more challenging cases of strictly positive values of parameter b 2 (0; 1] and m 2 (0;1).22 Our
results are derived under the assumption of airports and airline(s) having equal bargaining power.
All the analytical expressions are relegated to the Appendix. In all cases we obtain closed-form
solutions, but in some cases, expressions are rather cumbersome. Thus we have relied on simulations
for all ranges of parameters to prove the results that follow.
4.2 Upstream concentration and competition
Our rst set of results concerns the eects of a change in upstream concentration and the intensity
of upstream competition, the parameter b. Thus we rst analyze the case of separate vs. joint
airport ownership, which played a central role in the UK Competition Commission case.
21Given the hypothesis used here for the denition of the outside options, the results of this paper are analogous
to the case referred to as No Reaction in Iozzi and Valleti (2010).
22In some cases, with very intense airline competition, airlines might prefer to operate at only one airport in which
case the model breaks down; thus, only in these cases, we restrict parameters so this is excluded. Full details are in
the Appendix
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Proposition 1 An increase in upstream concentration always increases the landing charge. Sim-
ilarly, a decrease in b (that is, substitution between airports) weakly increases the landing charge.
Proposition 1 states that, going from two independent airports to jointly-owned airports, leads
unambiguously to an increase in the landing charge. The increase in the landing fee due to a
common ownership has also an identical adverse eect on consumers' nal prices, and consumers
unambiguously lose from an upstream merger. This happens for all values of m and independently
of the competition mode.
This result is intuitive but it is instructive, for the understanding of the other more complex
situations we consider in the rest of the paper, to show more precisely the channels through which
it arises. A change in upstream ownership has no eect on the airlines' outside options, nor does it
aect their concession cost. Instead, the outside option of the airport is strictly higher with joint
ownership: for instance, in case of a disagreement in airport A, routes 3 and 4 are still operated
from the other airport B which is owned by the same company. Hence, this level eect tends to
push the landing fees up. On the other hand, the airport's concession cost is aected by a change
in the upstream market structure. In particular, a landing fee discount is resisted more under joint
ownership as the benet of conceding, say, a unilateral discount to airline 1 in airport A, is traded-
o not only against a reduction in quantity along route 2 but also against the additional reduction
along routes 3 and 4. Thus both the outside option and the concession cost for the airport(s) push
up landing fees more the more concentrated in the upstream market.
In a similar fashion, a decrease in the parameter b of dierentiation between airports weakly
increases the landing fees. This is strictly true when there is airport competition (cases 2  2
and 2  4). It is worth noting, however, that, as b tends to 1, goods do not become perfectly
substitutable, as each route can y only from one specic airport. Therefore it is not necessarily
the case that landing fees decrease down to cost (i.e., zero in our normalization) even for very
intense airport competition. In fact, this happens only in case 2  2, both under Cournot and
Bertrand, when also m tends to innity: this implies that identical airlines can y identical routes
from identical airports. This limiting result also holds in the 2 4 case, but only under Bertrand
competition. Only in these cases, a fully deregulated airport industry could lead to ecient levels
of the landing fees. On the contrary, eciency is never achieved when airports are jointly owned,
for any combination of b, and m.23
4.3 Downstream concentration and competition
We now turn to assess the eects of a change in downstream concentration and competition. This
analysis captures changes in market structure of airlines, and their product dierentiation. The
23When market structure is 1  2, uniform landing fees still decrease in b but never converge to cost; otherwise,
discriminatory landing fees are invariant to b.
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main policy question relates here to the existence and eects of airlines' countervailing power.
Proposition 2 An increase in downstream concentration always reduces the landing charge when
downstream competition is in quantities. This also applies when downstream competition is in prices
but only with uniform landing charges.
Proposition 2 addresses the issue of countervailing buyer power in our setting. Indeed, it shows
that, as the downstream market becomes more concentrated, airlines are able to bargain lower
landing fees, but only under some conditions.
The main mechanism at work in Proposition 2 comes from the role of the outside options. More
downstream concentration (i.e., going from 2  4 to 2  2), means that an airline always has the
ability to y from an alternative route in disagreement: a multi-route airline (say, airline 13), if in
disagreement with airport A over route 1, can always y route 3 from airport B. The precise value
of this outside option will dier according to the mode of downstream competition and between the
discriminatory and the uniform case.
Take rst the case of Cournot competition. Under discriminatory landing fees, only airline
13 knows about the disagreement and readjusts its choice (i.e., it increases its quantity) in the
other airport; while in the uniform case, also its rival will do the same and hence the eect of
the readjustment of airline 13 is diluted. As far as the airport outside option is concerned, this is
always zero under the uniform fee. Under discrimination, airport A can still sell through route 2
but the value of this outside option is invariant with respect to the downstream concentration (i.e.,
going from 2  4 to 2  2), since q2 is always set at the anticipated Cournot equilibrium. Thus,
the outside option eect when going towards more concentrated airlines is always in favour of the
airlines, resulting in lower landing charges.
A similar story applies to the case of Bertrand competition with uniformity. In fact, the airport
still has a zero outside option under any market structure, while the airlines have a positive outside
option. The increase in the value of an airline outside option with more downstream concentration
is actually higher under uniformity (than under discrimination), contrary to the Cournot case. This
is because, in disagreement, under uniformity both airlines ying from the other airport B readjust
their prices upwards, which considerably relaxes competition, while under discrimination only airline
13 does so, while its rival (who is not aware of the breakdown), still sets its anticipated equilibrium
price under unrestricted competition. Under discrimination, this outside option in favour of the
airlines not only is smaller than under uniformity, but there is now also an opposing and prevailing
force via the outside option of the airport. To see this, recall that under discriminatory pricing and
2 4, the outside option to airport A when disagreeing with airline 1 is equal to q2(0; p2; p3; p4)  `2,
while, as the downstream market becomes more concentrated (i.e., the 2  2 case), the outside
option when disagreeing with airline 13 increases to q2(0; p2; p
0
3; p4)  `2, because of the upward
readjustment in the the price set by airline 13 on route 3, p03 which is strictly greater than p3.
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What is the eect on nal prices to consumers? Proposition 2 points towards a possible benecial
eect of an increase in downstream concentration, via a reduction in costs to the airlines which could
be passed on to consumers. However, this has to be contrasted with the tendency to increase prices
due to more concentration downstream.
Proposition 3 An increase in downstream concentration always increases nal consumer prices
unless, when in the discriminatory regime, downstream competition is in prices and m is suciently
large.
Intuitively, from Proposition 2, it is already clear that an increase in downstream concentration
makes consumers worse o when competition is in prices and under discrimination, since there
is no countervailing power and the landing fee already goes up. In the other cases, consumers
might benet to the extent that the countervailing buyer power is passed onto them; however,
the pass-through is not full under Cournot competition and the reduction in quantities following
concentration ultimately pushes nal prices up. It is only under Bertrand competition and uniform
fees instead, that there is countervailing power (from Proposition 2) and the pass-through eect
will prevail to the extent that competition is high.
4.4 Uniform vs discriminatory landing charges
In this section we consider the regulatory question whether or not to allow airports to bargain
discriminatory fees with each airline independently. This is at the core of recent changes in the
EU regulation. It turns out that the mode of competition plays a crucial role in answering this
question.
Proposition 4 With Cournot competition, uniform charges are always higher than discriminatory
charges. With Bertrand competition, the opposite is true.
The Proposition makes it clear that the mode of competition changes considerably the bargaining
behavior of the parties. One eect, common both to Cournot and Bertrand, comes from the outside
option of the airport: with discriminatory fees, the airport, when in disagreement with one airline,
can always sell to the other airline. Thus discrimination would tend to push up the fees because of
this level eect. Indeed, this is our nding with Bertrand competition, where this outside option
eects dominates. For instance, take airport A that negotiates over its prots `1q1 + `2q2: In
disagreement, it can still sell `2q
0
2. Notice that q
0
2 > q2, as airline 2 still plays the precommited
Bertrand price, but consumers, having observed the missing route 1, will partially readjust their
schedules through route 2.
Under Cournot competition instead, airline 2 precommits to its quantity and still sells exactly
q2. Thus the outside option eect is diluted under Cournot. In addition to this, under Cournot
competition, the concession costs for the airlines and for the airport push in the opposite direction
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and result, in the end, in higher uniform than discriminatory fees. We now detail this reasoning.
As far as the airlines are concerned, concession costs are lower when also the rival from the same
airport has to face the same increase in the landing fee, i.e., under uniformity. As to the airport,
the demand for its aggregate input is more responsive to changes of the uniform landing fee. This is
because, under discrimination, the change in the quantity along one route caused by a change of its
landing fee is always partially compensated by an opposite change along the other route. Therefore,
the opportunity cost of oering a uniform discount is much higher.
We also notice that the eect on the landing fees from Proposition 4 has a similar impact on
prots. Thus, airlines prefer discriminatory charges only when competition is in quantities while
airports have the opposite interest. Under Bertrand competition, it is airports who would prefer to
bargain over discriminatory fees, though this would penalize airlines.
4.5 Modes of competition and incentives to invest in capacity
In the previous section we showed that the mode of competition aects the comparison between
uniform and discriminatory fees. Now we conduct a dierent exercise. We x the regime of fee
charging and ask what are the eects of the dierent modes of competition. This is a customary
comparison in the literature on airline competition, as both modes of competition may be relevant
to the airline market, depending on the level of airport congestion, slot and aircraft availability.
Proposition 5 With uniform landing charges, Cournot competition always leads to charges higher
than Bertrand. With discriminatory landing charges, Bertrand competition leads to charges higher
than Cournot, except in case 2 4 when b and m are suciently large, when the opposite holds.
The result with uniform charges is mostly driven by the level of rms' prots under the two
dierent competition modes, as described by the LHS of eq. (10). Take for simplicity the case
2  4, so that outside options under uniform landing fees are zero for all the parties involved in a
bargain. For a given uniform landing fee, the prots of the downstream airlines are higher under
Cournot than under Bertrand, while the opposite is true for the prot of the airport, since output
is higher under Bertrand. Therefore, the ratio captured by the LHS of eq. (10) is unambiguously
\shifted up" under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. This generates the result stated in
the Proposition, over and above any other eect arising from concession costs.
Things are more involved with discriminatory fees. First of all, the airport always has an outside
option. This is particularly protable under Bertrand, since the other airline ies more passengers
in disagreement than under Cournot, at the anticipated respective equilibrium. This tends to
push landing fees up under Bertrand compared to Cournot. Second, concession costs become now
pivotal: a unilateral increase in the landing fees relaxes competition with strategic complements, and
therefore airlines are more likely to concede such an increase under Bertrand than under Cournot
competition. Again, this tends to increase landing charges in equilibrium under Bertrand compared
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to Cournot. The net result of these two eects and of the eect described for the uniform charges,
still at work here, is as described by the proposition, which makes clear that functional forms matter
for the net eect.
These results on the eect of the mode of competition on landing charges can also help us
inform the discussion about the reduction in congestion at airports via investments in new runaways,
terminals and/or improvements in the air trac management. While we do not have a model about
investment and congestion, we limit ourselves to note that reduction in congestion has the potential
to change the nature of competition among airlines. While investments will of course also enhance
demand, via introducing the possibility of having more routes, etc., we ask if, over and above these
eects, it is airports or airlines which have an interest in promoting the reduction of congestion, i.e.,
via sinking costs in a previous, unspecied phase, that might also alter the model of competition,
turning a Cournot market into a Bertrand one. Hence, via comparing the parties' prots under
Cournot and Bertrand in the dierent regimes, we could provide a partial answer to this.
It turns out that, as far as airports are concerned, there is always a fundamental trade o.
On the one hand, airports prefer the mode of competition that results in higher landing fees (as
characterized by Proposition 5). On the other hand, these landing fees are earned over passengers,
and in this respect Bertrand competition has an expansion output eect that is preferred by airports,
ceteris paribus. Hence the comparison of prots for airports typically depends on the parameters
of dierentiation.24
As far as airlines are compared, it is clear that, any time Bertrand competition increases land-
ing fees, this negative eect is further magnied by the more intense competition. In fact, it turns
out that the increase in competition under Bertrand compared to Cournot typically prevails over
the eect from landing fees, even in those cases with uniform charges when Bertrand would allow
to secure cheaper costs (again, see Proposition 5). However this result is not robust to all mar-
ket structures, and therefore we just report this general tendency instead of formalising it into a
proposition.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have set out a model of up and downstream bargaining and competition and
applied it to airports. Our model sheds light on some key policy questions such as: What are the
consequences of joint ownership of airports and airlines? Do remote airports need price regulation?
Should airports be permitted to price discriminate between airlines?
Our model consists of upstream airports, who compete with each other to varying extents,
24In line with Proposition 5, airports have higher prots, in most cases, when landing fees are discriminatory.
When they are uniform, Bertrand yields higher prots when the degree of up- or downstream dierentiation is not
too high.
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bargaining landing fees with downstream competing airlines. It isolates a number of eects on
landing fees, the net eect of which determines the answer to the questions above.
Thus our results can be summarized as follows. First, should jointly owned airports be broken
up? A break up turns out to reduce ` in all cases as airlines have an increased outside opportunity
to switch airports. Second, what about the countervailing power of airlines? Airports frequently
argue that they are stopped from raising ` if they are dealing with a dominant airline. Indeed, our
model shows that, as would be expected, airline concentration means that airlines might potentially
y the same route from a nearby airport. This raises the airline outside option and the bargained
` falls, just as the airports argue.
But there are other eects. First, if the airport if the airport can charge dierent prices to
airlines (i.e., a discriminatory inout price), then the airport's bargaining position is stronger (it
has an outside option in event of disagreement with one airline), and so ` rises. Second, the
bargaining response of airlines to proposed changes in ` depends on the mode of competition with
other airlines. With Bertrand competition, falls in ` that might result in airlines reduce their prices
and provoke a tough competitive response from other airlines. So airlines push less hard for falls
in ` at the margin, with Bertrand competition than with Cournot. So, as regards countervailing
power, increasing airline power reduces ` depending on airline product market competition and
airport ability to charge discriminatory prices: ` turns out to fall with Cournot competition and
with Bertrand competition but non-discriminatory prices.
Third, and related, would that countervailing airline power lead to lower prices for consumers?
We nd that the lower ` in Cournot is not passed on to consumers, since airlines succeed in lowering
` but keep some of that surplus. The only case where there is countervailing airline power turns
out to be with strong Bertrand competition, i.e., with highly substitutable routes in which case
consumers gain from the reduced ` in the bargain. So relying on countervailing power is only likely
to be welfare enhancing in very special circumstances.
Fourth, do airlines prefer the new EU rules that appear to make discriminatory pricing harder?
Broadly speaking, discriminatory pricing tends to raise ` for it raises airports outside option. But
airlines resist discriminatory pricing more when they are Cournot competitors, so, overall, ` is
lower in this case. Thus, if there was Bertrand competition at airports and the airport moved from
discriminatory to uniform, ` would fall. Therefore the model would predict that airlines would
welcome the proposed EU rule at non-crowded airports.25
The nal question we touched indirectly is how an airport expansion would aect prots of
the various parties. There are two broad eects. First, for a given `, an expansion raises airport
prots, since quantity rises. But second, an expansion might change the nature of competition and
so change `. It is likely that an expansion of a crowded airport changes competition from Cournot
25In our model all airlines have the same bargaining power. An airline who is \better" at bargaining (Ryanair
perhaps?) would oppose the non-discrimination rule.
24
to Bertrand. If there is discriminatory pricing, then this raises `, if uniform this lowers `. So the
eect on airports depends on the type of pricing. As for airlines, they too have more volume, but
if competition changes from Cournot to Bertrand their output prices fall and prots might fall. In
most of our cases, airlines prots tend to fall due to the change in competition mode, but we do
not have any general results here.
Our approach to the analysis of the vertical structure of oligopolistics up and downstream
industries is amenable to other applications. As mentioned in the Introduction, retailing shows
many analogies and similar modelling features. Of course, the model leaves a number of avenues
for future work. One is investment incentives in airports. This requires a dynamic investment
choice model and the resulting impact of a change in capacity on competition. Second, there are
a number of potentially interesting issues in slot trading. One feature often not realised is that
airlines incur substantial sunk costs at airports, thus the grandfather rights to slots may provide
appropriate incentives to incur such costs. But this process interacts with competition and so its
eects still await for further analysis. Third, we have not considered the hub nature of airports
such as Heathrow, which is somewhat a special case, but raises a number of other issues related
oplatforms and demand externalities. A related issue on slots is that airlines in full airports, with
` regulated for example, can switch airports by buying slots from each other: an eect we have not
modeled but would require an additional price in the model and bargaining between airlines.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we present the analysis of the dierent market structures when downstream com-
petition is in quantities. The analysis of the Bertrand case, where resulting equilibrium expressions
are less neat, is relegated to a separate Appendix, available at http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/
iozzi.
Demand system. In case of breakdown of the negotiations, some routes are not operated and
consumers readjust their behaviour on the basis of the goods on oer. Therefore, the system of
inverse demands used for the evaluation of the outside option need to be redetermined, setting equal
to zero all quantities not sold.
When q1 is not sold, inverse demand comes from the maximisation of (1), setting q1 = 0. For
good 2 (similar expression are for the other goods), this is given by




(q3 + q4) (A-1)
When q1 and q2 are not sold, inverse demand comes from the maximisation of (1), setting
q1 = q2 = 0. This is given by




qj for i = 3; 4; i 6= j: (A-2)
Second stage. We present here the equilibrium quantities chosen by the downstream rms in the
second stage of the game, as a function of the negotiated landing fee.




[pi(q)  `i]  qi for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (A-3)
Equilibrium quantities, obtained by solving the system of four FOCs of the above four problems,
are denoted by q4i (`). For good 1 (similar expressions holds for the other goods), we have
q41 (`) =
1 +m





m(3  2b) + 4(1 + b)
+
m[m(3  2b2) + 4b+ 4]`2   [2m2(3  b2) + 20m(1 + b) + 16(1 + b(2 + b)]`1




These quantities, when plugged into the relevant demand functions (2), result in the following
equilibrium price for good 1 (similar expression hold for the other goods)
p41 (`) =
1
m(3 + 2b) + 4(1 + b)
 (A-5)(
[(3  2b2)m3 + (28  12b2)(1 + b)m2 + 56m(1 + 2b+ b2) + 32(1 + 3b2 + b3 + 3b)]`1
(m(3  2b) + 4(1 + b))(4b+ 4 +m)




m(3  2b) + 4(1 + b) +
m[m(3  2b2) + 4(1 + b)]`2
(m(3  2b) + 4(1 + b))(4b+ 4 +m)
!)
The resulting second stage equilibrium prots are denoted as 4i (`) = i(q
4
i (`)).
Take now the case when the downstream market is operated by two independent airlines; airline
13 solves the following problem
max
q1;q3
[p1(q)  `1]  q1 + [p3(q)  `3]  q3;
while a similar problem is faced by airline 24. Equilibrium quantities, obtained by solving the system
of four FOCs of the above two problems, are denoted by q2i (`). For good 1 (similar expressions







3(1  b) + 2m2(11  5b2) + 48m(1 + b) + 32(1 + 2b+ b2)]`1
(m+ 4)(3m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))(m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))
+
m[3m2(1  b) + 16(m(1  b2) + 1 + b)]`2
(m+ 4)(3m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))(m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))
+
bm[(16(1 + b)  3m2(1  b))]`4 + 2bm[3m2(1  b) + 12m+ 16(1 + b)]`3
(m+ 4)(3m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))(m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))
)
: (A-6)
These quantities, when plugged into the relevant demand functions (2), result in the following






(m+ 4)(3m+ 4)(3m  3bm+ 4b+ 4)(m  bm+ 4b+ 4) n
[3m4(1  2b+ b2) + 40m3(1  b) + 256m(1 + b) + (168  88b2)m2 + 128(1 + 2b+ b2)]`1
  8bm2[2 +m(1  b)]`3 +m(2 +m(1  b))[3m2(1  b) + 16(1 +m+ b)]`2
+ 2bm[5m2(1  b) + 16(1 + b+m)]`4
o
: (A-7)
The resulting second stage equilibrium prots are denoted as 2i (`) = i(q
2
i (`)).
First stage. We now present the subgame perfect equilibrium landing charges negotiated by up-
and downstream rms in the rst stage of the game. For each market structure, we derive the
equilibrium rst in the uniform and then in the discriminatory case.
2 4: The bargaining problem between airport A and airlines 1 and 2 to set the uniform charge `A
has been described in the main text in (7). Likewise, airport B and airlines 3 and 4 form a distinct
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bilateral bargaining unit for the denition of `B . All parties' outside option are equal to zero. From






for h = A;B: (A-8)
The bargaining problem between airport A and airline i (with i = 1; 2) to set the discriminatory
charge `i has been described in the main text in (8). Likewise, airport B and airline j (with j = 3; 4)
form two distinct bilateral bargaining units for the denition of `j . The airport's outside option is
now positive: in case of airport A when negotiating with, say, airline 1, it is given by the prots
obtained by selling the input to airline 2. Since airline 2 is not aware of the breakdown of the
negotiation, the quantity oered in the market is equal to q42 (`), as in (A-4); the airport's outside
option is then 24A = `2q
4
2 (`). Similarly for all the other negotiations; from the FOCs of the four








for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (A-9)
2 2: The bargaining problem between airport A and airlines 13 and 24 to set the uniform charge




  [2213 (`A; `B)  2213 ]1  : (A-10)
The airport's outside options is zero. Instead, the airline's outside option is positive: it is given by
the prots obtained by serving route 3 from airport B. Given the consumers' readjustment, in case
of disagreement on `A, in the second stage of the game, airlines 13 and 24 would be aware of the
absence of operating routes from airport A and solve the problem
max
qi
[pi(0; 0; qi; qj)  `i]  qi for i; j = 3; 4; i 6= j: (A-11)
We denote with q02i (`) the equilibrium quantities, obtained by solving the system of two FOCs of
the above two problems. For good 3, we have (similar expressions hold for the other good):
q023 =
(1 +m)(m`3   2(2(1 + b) +m)`4 + 4(1 + b) +m)
(4b+ 4 + 3m)(4 + 4b+m)
(A-12)




4 )   `3]q023 . Similarly for the other








for h = A;B: (A-13)
The bargaining problem between airport A and airline 13 to set the discriminatory charge `1 is
max
`1
[22A (`1; ` 1)  22A ]  [2213 (`1; ` 1)  2213 ]1  (A-14)
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Likewise, the same airport A and airline 24 form a distinct bilateral bargaining unit for the denition
of `2; also, airport B and airlines 13 and 24 form two distinct bilateral bargaining units for the
denition of `3 and `4 respectively.
The airport's outside option is positive: in case of airport A (when negotiating with airline 13),
it is given by the prots obtained by selling the input to airline 24. Since airline 24 is not aware of
the breakdown of the negotiation, the quantity oered in the market is equal to q22 (`), as in (A-6);
the airport's outside option is then 22A = `2q
2
2 (`). The airline's outside option is also positive
and it is given by the prots obtained by oering the good on route 3. Airline 13 is clearly aware
of the breakdown of the negotiation on `1. Therefore, it adjusts its quantity on route 3 taking into
account that its rival will keep oering the quantity as if all products were sold in the market. Thus,





2 ; q3; q
2
4 )  `3]  q3: (A-15)
Let this quantity be denoted by q0023 (`) and be given by
q0023 (`) =
(1 +m)





(m+ 4)(3m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))(m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))
+
2bm[5m2(1  b) + 16(1 + b+m)]`2 +m[(2 +m(1  b))(3m2(1  b) + 16(1 + b+m))]`4
(m+ 4)(3m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))(m(1  b) + 4(1 + b))
  2[3(1 + b
2   2b)m4 + 28(1  b)m3 + 4(23  9b2)m2 + 128(1 + b)m+ 64(1 + 2b+ b2)]`3










4 )   `3]  q0023 . Similarly for the









for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (A-17)
12: The bargaining problem between airport AB and airlines 13 and 24 to set the uniform charge
`A is as follows
max
`A
[12AB (`A; `B)  12AB ]  [1213 (`A; `B)  1213 ]1  : (A-18)
The airport's outside option is positive and it is given by the prots obtained by serving routes 3
and 4. Since both airlines operating these routes are aware of the breakdown of the negotiation,
they solve problem (A-11) and choose quantities as in (A-12). The airport's outside option is thus




4 `4. Similarly, given the consumer's readjustment, the airline's outside




4 )  `3]  q023 . Similarly for the other negotiations; from






for h = A;B: (A-19)
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[12AB (`1; ` 1)  12AB ]  [1213 (`1; ` 1)  1213 ]1  (A-20)
The same players also bargain over `3; similarly, the same airport AB and airline 24 form two
distinct bilateral bargaining units for the denition of `2 and `4.
The airport's outside option (when bargaining over `1) is positive and it is given by the prots
obtained by selling inputs 2 and 4 to airline 24 and input 3 to airline 13. In disagreement, airline
13 is clearly aware of the breakdown of the negotiation but airline 24 is not. The quantities sold
by airline 24 are therefore q22 (`) and q
2
4 (`), as in (A-6), while airline 13 solves the problem
(A-15), oering quantity q0023 as in (A-16). The airport's outside option is therefore given by
12AB = `2  q22 (`) + `3  q0023 (`) + `4  q24 (`).
The airline's outside option (when bargaining over `1) is also positive and it is given by the
prots obtained by the serving route 3 from airport B. The quantity sold along this route is to be
determined exactly in the same way just above described and therefore the airline's outside option






4 )   `3]  q0023 . Similarly for the other negotiation; from the






for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (A-21)
Summary of equilibrium. Equilibrium landing charges are given in (A-8), (A-13) and (A-19) in case
of uniform charges, and in (A-9), (A-17) and (A-21) in case of discriminatory charges. It is also
useful to look at these same expressions for specic values of our market parameters, b and m.
When b = 0 and m = 0 the equilibrium landing charges are identical across the dierent market
structures, as already commented in Section 4.1 in the main text. They are given in (11) for m = 0;
this expression is also valid when b = 0 for the uniform case. For b = 0, discriminatory landing fees
are given by (12). The expressions for the limiting cases corresponding to b = 1 and m ! 1 are
instead provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Landing charges under Cournot competition when b = 1 and m!1
b = 1 m!1
































































Once landing charges are known in each situation, we can derive all the variables we analyse and
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compare in Propositions 1-5. In particular, the equilibrium quantities at a symmetric equilibrium,
derived from (A-4) and (A-6), simplify respectively to
q2i (`) =
(1 +m)(1  `)




2bm+ 3m+ 4 + 4b
:
The price of each good is then obtained from (2), and it is simply
pi = 1  2(1 + b)qi:
The consumer surplus of the representative consumer is obtained subtracting the total expenditure
from (1), obtaining
CS = 4(1 + b)q2i :
The prots for each agent are also immediately derived.
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Appendix B (for the referees only)
In this Appendix, we present the analysis of the case of Bertrand competition in the downstream
market.
Demand system. The demand system when all the goods are sold int he market is given in the
text in (3). In case of breakdown of a negotiation, some routes are not operated and consumers
readjust their behaviour on the basis of the goods on oer. Therefore, the system of demand curves
used for the evaluation of the outside option need to be redetermined, setting equal to zero all
quantities not sold.
When q1 is not sold, the consumer maximise (1) w.r. to all quantities except q1, which needs to
be set equal to 0. Solving for the system of direct demand, demand for good 2 (similar expression
are for the other goods) is given by
q2(1; p2; p3; p4) = 1 +m
4(1 + b)((1  b)m2 + 3m+ 2(1 + b)) 
n
2[m(1  b) + 2(1 + b)]
  [(1  b)m2 + 4(1 + b+m)]p2 + 2bmp3 +m[2 +m(1  b)]p4
o
(B-1)
When q1 and q2 are not sold, demand for good 2 (similar expressions hold for the other goods)
is given by
q3(1;1; p3; p4) = 1 +m
4(1 + b)(1 + b+m)

n
2(1 + b)  [m+ 2(1 + b)]p3 +mp4
o
(B-2)
Second stage. We rst solve the case in which the downstreammarket is operated by 4 independent
airlines. Each airline solves
max
pi
[pi   `i]  qi(p) for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (B-3)
Equilibrium prices, obtained by solving the system of 4 FOC's of the above four problems are
denoted by p4i (`). For good 1 (similar expressions holds for the other goods), we have
p41 (`) =
2(1 + b+m  bm)




2z1[(1  2b+ b2)m4 + 8(1  b)m3 + 7(3  b2)m2 + 22(1 + b)m+ 8(1 + 2b+ b2)]`1
[3m2(1  b) + 7m+ 4(1 + b)]z2
+
mz1[(1  2b+ b2)m3 + 6(1  b)m2 + (9  2b2)m+ 4(1 + b)]`3
[3m2(1  b) + 7m+ 4(1 + b)]z2 for i = 1; : : : ; 4; (B-4)
where z1  (1  b)m2 +3m+2(1+ b) and z2  [(1  b)m2 + (5  2b)m+4(1+ b)][(1  b)m2 + (5+
2b)m+ 4(1 + b)].
We do not report here the actual expressions for q4i (`), the equilibrium quantities obtained
plugging back the equilibrium price into the demand function. The resulting second stage equilib-
rium prots are denoted as 4i (`) = i(q
4
i (`)).
Take now the case when the downstream market is operated by 2 independent airlines; airline
13 solve the following problem
max
p1;p3
[p1   `1]  q1(p) + [p3   `3]  q3(p) (B-5)
1
while a similar problem is faced by airline 24. Equilibrium prices, obtained by solving the system









8bm2[2 +m(1  b)]`2 +m[(2 + (1  b)m)(3(1  b)m2 + 16(1 + b+m)]`3
+ [6(1 + b2   2b)m4 + 56(1  b)m3 + 8(23  9b2)m2 + 256(1 + b)m+ 128(1 + 2b+ b2)]`1
+ 2bm[5(1  b)m2 + 16(1 + b+m)]`4
o
for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (B-6)
where z3  (4 +m)(4 + 3m)[3m(1  b) + 4(1 + b)][(1  b)m+ 4(1 + b)]
We do not report here the actual expressions for q2i (`), the equilibrium quantities obtained
plugging back the equilibrium price into the demand function. The resulting second stage equilib-
rium prots are denoted as 2i (`) = i(q
2
i (`)).
First stage. We now present the subgame perfect equilibrium landing charges negotiated by up-
and downstream rms in the rst stage of the game. For each market structure, we derive the
equilibrium rst in the uniform and then in the discriminatory case.
2  4: The bargaining problems are similar in their nature to the ones illustrated in the case of








for h = A;B; (B-7)







for i = 1; : : : ; 4;
where
K1 [ 3(2  )b4 + (22  13)b3   3(10  7)b2 + 3(6  5)b  4(1  )]m6
+ [16(1  )b4 + (18 + 7)b3   10(12  7)b2 + (122  97)b  36(1  )]m5
+ [16(2  )b4   16(8  7)b3   (74 + 11)b2 + 5(58  41)b  120(1  )]m4
+ [ 40(1  )b4   88(2  )b3 + 240(1  )b2 + 151(2  )b  200(1  )]m3
+ [ 28(2  )b4 + 4(17  24)b3 + 4(105  68)b2 + 4(29 + 8)b  180(1  )]m2
+ [24(1  )b4 + 4(50  31)b3 + 4(61  23)b2   4(4  23)b  84(1  )]m
+ 16(2  )b4 + 16(5  2)b3 + 48b2   16(1  2)b  16(1  ): (B-9)
2 2: The bargaining problem between airport A and airlines 13 and 24 to set the uniform charge
`A is as in (A-10). The airline's outside option is given by the prots obtained by serving route 3
from airport B. Given the consumers' readjustment, in case of disagreement on `A, in the second
2
stage of the game, airlines 13 and 24 would be aware of the absence of operating routes from airport
A and solve the problem
max
pi
[pi   `i]  qi(1;1; pi; pj) for i = 3; 4; i 6= j: (B-10)
We denote with p02i (`) the equilibrium prices, obtained by solving the system of 2 FOC's of the
above 2 problems. For good 3, we have (similar expression hold for the other good)
p023 =
[2(1 + b)][4(1 + b) + 3m] + 2[2(1 + b) +m]2`3 +m[2(1 + b) +m]`4
[4(1 + b) + 3m][4(1 + b) +m]
(B-11)
Using the relevant demand functions (B-2), airline 13's outside option is then 2213 = [p
02
3   `3] 
q02i (1;1; p023 ; p024 ). Similarly for the other negotiations.
However, the bargaining problem in (A-10) is not dened for the entire range of parameters over
which we carry out the rest of our analysis. Indeed, when competition is very intense (i.e., b and m
are both suciently large), the right term in (A-10) becomes negative since each negotiating airline
would obtain higher prots from operating from the other airport only. To avoid this, we impose
the following implicit restriction on our demand parameters
(1 + b)(1 +m)(2(1 + b) +m)
(1 + b+m)(4(1 + b) +m)2
>
2(2 +m)
(1 + b)(4 +m)2
: (B-12)
Graphically, the combinations of parameters which satisfy restriction (B-12) lie south-west to the
locus depicted in Figure A.1.
Fig. A.1 - The restriction on the space of parameters






; for h = A;B; (B-13)
3
where
K2  64[(1 + b)4(5   8)]
+ 32[3b4   (37  30)b3   (129  90)b2   (135  90)b  46 + 30]m
+ 4[(94  59)b4   2(179  163)b2 + 2(87  35)b3   2(431  313)b  424 + 289]m2
+ 2[2(17  18)b4 + 3(100  63)b3 + (172  9)b2   (604  505)b+ 361   510]m3
  2[3(4  )b4   (41  40)b3   (149  80)b2 + 3(19  26)b  123 + 169]m4
  [2(2  )b4 + (16  3)b3   (46  33)b2   (32  7)b+ 58  43]m5
+ [b(3  b2)(2  ) + (3  b2)   4]m6 (B-14)
K3    [1  b2   2b]m4 + [15b2 + 6b  11 + 2b3]m3 + [ 30b(1  b)  42 + 18b3]m2
+ [4b3   8b2   28b  16]4m  [b2 + 3b+ 3]32b  32 (B-15)
The bargaining problem between airport A and airline 13 to set the discriminatory charge `1 is
given in (A-14)
The airport's outside option is positive: in case of airport A (when negotiating with airline 13),
it is given by the prots obtained by selling the input to airline 24. Since airline 24 is not aware of
the breakdown of the negotiation, it sets prices equal to p22 (`) and p
2
4 (`), as in (B-6). Instead,
airline 13 is clearly aware of the breakdown of the negotiation on `1 and also also knows that its
rival is not aware of the breakdown of the negotiation. Therefore, not only it adjusts its price on
route 3 but also does so taking into account that its rival will keep setting the price as if all products
were sold in the market. Thus, it solves the problem
max
p3
[p3   `3]  q3(1; p22 ; p3; p24 ): (B-16)









8bm2[(1  b)m+ 2]`1 + 2bm[5(1  b)m2 + 16(1 + b+m)]`3
+ 2[3(1  2b+ b2)m4 + 28(1  b)m3 + 4(23  9b2)m2 + 128(1 + b)m+ 64(1 + 2b+ b2)]`2
+m[3(1  2b+ b2)m3 + 22(1  b)m2 + 16(3  b2)m+ 32(1 + b)]`4
o
(B-17)
The airport's outside option is then given by 22A = `2 q2(1; p22 ; p0023 ; p24 ). The airline's outside
option is also positive and it given by the prots obtained by oering the good on route 3, ie.
2213 = [p
002
3   `3]  q3(1; p22 ; p0023 ; p24 ). Similarly for the other negotiations; from the FOCs of






for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (B-18)
4
where
K4 [ 3(2  )b2 + (10  7)b  4(1  )]m3 + [4(2  3)b2 + 16(2  )b  24(1  )]m2
+ [2(26  17)b2 + 2(24  7)b  36(1  )]m+ 24(2  )b2 + 8(4  )b  16(1  )
(B-19)
12: The bargaining problem between airport AB and airlines 13 and 24 to set the uniform charge
`A is as in (A-18)
The airport's outside option is positive and it is given by the prots obtained by serving routes
3 and 4. Since both airlines operating these routes are aware of the breakdown of the negotiation,
they solve problem (B-10) and choose prices quantities as in (B-11). The airport's outside option
is thus given by 12AB = `3  q3(1;1; p023 ; p024 ) + `4  q4(1;1; p023 ; p024 ). The airline's outside
option has a similar nature: both airlines set prices (A-12) and the airline's outside option is thus
given by 1213 = [p
02
3   `3]  q3(1;1; p023 ; p024 ).26 Similarly for the other negotiation; from the






for h = A;B: (B-20)
where
K5 [1  b2   2b]m4   [2b3 + 15b2 + 6b  11]m3   6[3b3 + 5b2   5b  7]m2
  16[b3   2b2   7b  4]m+ 32[b3 + 3b2 + 3b+ 1] (B-21)
The bargaining problem between airport AB and airline 13 to set the discriminatory charge `1
is given in (A-20). The airport's outside option is positive and it is given by the prots obtained by
selling inputs 2 and 4 to airline 24 and input 3 to airline 13. In disagreement, airline 13 is clearly
aware of the breakdown of the negotiation but airline 24 is not. The prices set by airline 24 are
therefore p22 (`) and p
2
4 (`), as in (B-6), while airline 13 solves the problem (B-16), setting price
p0023 as in (B-17).
The airport's outside option is therefore given by 12AB =
P
i=2;:::;4 `i  qi(1; p22 ; p0023 ; p24 ).
The airline's outside option is also positive and it given by the prots obtained by the selling
oering the good on route 3. The quantity sold along this route is to be determined exactly in
the same way just above described and therefore the airline's outside option is given by 1213 =
[p0023   `3]  qi(1; p22 ; p0023 ; p24 ). Similarly for the other negotiation; from the FOCs of the four






for i = 1; : : : ; 4: (B-22)
26For exactly the same reasons discussed in illustrating the case 2 2, restriction (B-12) applies also to this case.
5
Summary of equilibrium landing charges. As under Cournot competition, it is also useful
to look at these same expressions for specic values of our market parameters, b and m. When
b = 0 and m = 0 and charges are uniform, they are identical to the ones obtained under Cournot
competition. This is also the case when charges are discriminatory and m = 0. On the other hand,
when charges are discriminatory and b = 0, the equilibrium landing charges, again identical across
the dierent market structures, is given in (13) in the main text. The expressions for b = 1 and
m!1 are instead provided in Table 2.
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